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CHAPTER 7 
Microfinance Beyond the Standard? Evaluating 




Microfinance was successful in increasing access to credit for micro, small and 
medium enterprises in developing countries, particularly in urban areas. The offer 
of installment loans as the standard credit product for new and very small custom-
ers has been indentified as one of the keys that enabled microfinance institutions 
to reach out to formerly unbanked entrepreneurs. However, these standard loans 
always were considered as inadequate for agricultural entrepreneurs with seasonal 
production cycles. For this reason, this paper investigates the effects of providing 
flexible agricultural microfinance loans (flex loans) to farmers as an alternative to 
standard installment loans. The study was carried out in cooperation with two 
banks of the AccessHolding Microfinance AG in Tanzania and Madagascar. A 
mixed-methods approach was applied relying on observations during field visits 
and in-depth portfolio analyses. 
Our results reveal that the combination of standard and flex loans enables the 
investigated microfinance institution to address a wide range of agricultural pro-
ducers. Based on our results it seems very unlikely that seasonal agricultural pro-
ducers would have had credit access without flex loans. Standard loans are only 
adequate to address non-seasonal agricultural producers. We also find that non-
seasonal agricultural producers repay their loans with delinquency rates similar or 
even better than those of non-farmers. For seasonal agricultural producers a redis-
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tribution of principal payments from periods with low agricultural returns (grace 
periods) to periods when agricultural returns are high is necessary to keep their 
delinquency rates at the level of non-farmers. Furthermore, we find that flex loans 
can be offered sustainably and that agricultural lending has become a strategic fo-
cus of the Access Bank in Madagascar. 
1 Introduction 
The impacts of microfinance on developing countries are currently discussed con-
troversially. Microfinance has achieved the financial inclusion of millions of mi-
cro, small, and medium entrepreneurs that had no access to financial services be-
fore (Love and Peria, 2012). Merely thirty years have passed since the foundation 
of the Grameen Bank, and already there are signs of microcredit oversupply and 
even borrower over-indebtedness, particularly in emerging countries (Taylor, 
2011; Vogelgesang, 2003). However, the contribution of microfinance to invest-
ment stimulation, employment generation, and economic development is less con-
troversial (Duvendack et al., 2011; Pande et al., 2012). 
Lending techniques applied by microfinance institutions (MFIs) are adequate to 
reflect the business conditions of many micro, small, and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs). Loan sizes are adapted to the borrowers’ incomes based on intensive 
client assessments, relationships are established by carefully increasing loan 
amounts for good borrowers, and loan products are standardized by offering 
mainly installment loans (standard loans) with loan repayment starting immedi-
ately after loan disbursement. Product standardization is even considered as one of 
the main reasons for the high repayment rates and, hence, the success of microfi-
nance (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000; Jain and Mansuri, 2003). 
However, product standardization also has several drawbacks. 
When repayment schedules cannot be harmonized with investment returns, the 
number of potential projects that can be realized is limited. For a project to be fi-
nanced with a short-term installment loan, fast turnovers and regular cash flows of 
nearly the same level are required. Longer-term projects need time to mature 
though before they generate returns sufficiently high to repay the loan balance. In 
consequence, profitable investments might not even be realized due to mismatches 
between cash flow and repayment obligations (Field et al., 2011). Most MFI cli-
ents are, hence, traders, using their loans to finance working capital, and the share 
of loans for long-term projects remains low (Dalla Pellegrina, 2011). 
Moreover, while microfinance has reached many urban entrepreneurs, it still 
needs to accomplish its mission for MSMEs in rural areas, particularly for entre-
preneurs in the agricultural sector (Hermes et al., 2011; Llanto, 2007). Most agri-
cultural production types are characterized by a high level of seasonality leading 
to mismatches between expenditures during planting season and revenues at the 
time of harvest (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). Particularly here, standard 
loans, which cannot account for seasonal cash-flow patterns of agricultural pro-
ducers, seem to fall behind.  
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The provisioning of microfinance loans with flexible repayment schedules (flex 
loans) is, hence, stipulated by the literature (e.g., Llanto, 2007; Meyer, 2002; Dalla 
Pellegrina, 2011; Field et al., 2011). Yet, despite the potential of flex loans to in-
crease the outreach of MFIs, at present only few MFIs are willing to make repay-
ment schedules more flexible. 
Based on field visits and data of the management information systems of two 
banks of the AccessHolding Microfinance AG in Tanzania and Madagascar, this 
paper provides a mixed-methods evaluation of product adequacy and the effects of 
providing standard and flex loans to agricultural firms. The rest of this report is 
organized as follows: In the second part, we will provide a brief discussion why 
standard loans are mainly applied in microfinance and how this determines the 
type of MSMEs financed by MFIs. In the third part, the analyzed MFIs will be 
briefly presented. Based on this background, we will present four evaluation ques-
tions and the evaluation methodology. In the fourth part, we will assess agricul-
tural lending in both banks along these evaluation questions. 
2 Lending Principles in Microfinance 
Driven by negative experiences of the supply-led development finance period in 
the 1960s and 1970s and the failure of state-owned development banks in the 
1980s (Adams and Graham, 1981; Maurer, 2011), governments and central banks 
in many developing countries have started to improve the regulatory and operating 
environment in the financial sector. These improvements were important precon-
ditions for the successful development of the commercial microfinance industry, 
which is driven by various attempts such as developing regular banks to better 
serve MSMEs and professionalizing existing and creating new MFIs (Krahnen and 
Schmidt, 1994; Maurer, 2011). For MFIs, informal MSMEs have represented the 
typical target clients as informal MSMEs are normally neglected by regular banks. 
Rather than applying the conventional, collateral-based lending approach followed 
by regular banks or the joint liability principle of group lending mostly applied by 
non-commercial MFIs, commercial MFIs typically use income based individual 
(liability) lending techniques instead. Thereby the family and the business income, 
i.e., the total household income, determines the repayment capacity of a loan ap-
plicant and is the basis for the decision of the MFI whether a loan is granted and 
how much credit will be disbursed. As reliable income statements or balance sheet 
data are hardly available in the informal MSME sector, MFIs themselves carry out 
detailed assessments of loan applicants to evaluate their repayment capacities1. 
Driven by the support of donors, development finance institutions, and commercial 
banks, individual lending MFIs can today be found all over the world, although 
mainly in urban areas (Llanto, 2007). 
                                                          
1 For further information on the principles of microfinance the reader is referred to Ar-
mendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2010) and Kong and Turvey (2008).  
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One of the main reasons for the success of MFIs is the provisioning of standard 
loans. Standard loans are also widely applied by individual lending MFIs. Despite 
the fact that installments of standard loans are adapted to the income of the bor-
rower, including the cash flow of the financed project and other income sources of 
the borrower’s household (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010), repay-
ment schedules of standard loans cannot be harmonized with the cash-flow occur-
rence of the borrower. Thus, standard loans might be adequate for businesses gen-
erating fast returns on a regular basis, e.g., petty traders (Llanto, 2007). However, 
for longer-term projects with irregular and uncertain return patterns, standard 
loans seem counterintuitive as such projects need time to mature before first re-
turns are realized. The project can only be financed if an entrepreneur is able to 
smooth temporary cash-flow shortfalls of the financed project by other income 
sources. In consequence, profitable projects cannot be realized at all or only with 
higher repayment risks when cash flow and repayment obligations do not match 
(Field et al., 2011). Hence, product standardization might reduce default risks for 
clients with continuous cash flows but limits the focus of MFIs to projects fulfill-
ing the product requirements (Weber and Musshoff, 2012). Unsurprisingly, most 
MFI clients are traders with fast turnovers, using their loans to finance mainly 
working capital. The share of long-term loans offered by MFIs and especially 
loans to entrepreneurs with seasonal returns typically found in the agricultural sec-
tor, however, remains low (Dalla Pellegrina, 2011). 
Agricultural production is often characterized by a high level of seasonality 
which frequently leads to periodical imbalances between expenditures in the plant-
ing and revenues in the harvesting seasons (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). 
For this reason, loans with flexible loan repayment schedules harmonized with ag-
ricultural production cycles are often stipulated in the agricultural economics lit-
erature (Meyer, 2002; Dalla Pellegrina, 2011). In this context, Meyer (2002) ar-
gues that firms in Bangladesh with significant agricultural income would be better 
served with loan repayment schedules matching expected cash flows and shifting 
principal repayment to the time of harvest. Furthermore, Dalla Pellegrina (2011) 
states that compared to (flexible) loans of informal money lenders and conven-
tional banks, standard loans of MFIs are less suitable to finance agricultural pro-
jects. The absence of adequate loan products for agricultural firms is, hence, con-
sidered to be one reason why the penetration of agricultural clients by MFIs is still 
low (Christen and Pearce, 2005; Llanto, 2007). 
In addition to inadequate loan products, the outreach of MFIs to rural areas 
where most of the agricultural production takes place is constrained by higher op-
erational costs when compared to urban areas. The reason is that distances are 
longer and population densities are lower, making it more time and fuel consum-
ing for banks to approach and to monitor borrowers (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2010; Caudill et al., 2009). Collection costs are considered to be one of 
the largest operational cost components in microfinance (Shankar, 2007). Here, 
grace periods increase the time period that loan amounts are outstanding and, 
hence, lead to higher interest returns for the MFI, contributing to compensate for 
higher operational costs. 
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Despite the potential of flexible repayment schedules to increase the outreach 
of MFIs to rural areas, most MFIs are still reluctant to make repayment schedules 
more flexible. They might fear that more flexibility reduces repayment rates. 
However, there is no empirical evidence that could support this concern. However, 
most research focusing on the effects of flexible repayment schedules on loan re-
payment is based on experiments, with mixed results that need to be proven in re-
ality yet. In a field experiment in India, Field and Pande (2008) randomly assigned 
microfinance loans to borrowing groups of a MFI with either monthly or weekly 
repayment installments. They find that different repayment schedules have no sig-
nificant influence on loan delinquencies. In a later experiment with the same MFI, 
Field et al. (2011) complement their first investigations by analyzing the effect of 
a two-month grace period2 on loan delinquencies of borrowers. They find higher 
loan delinquencies for loans with grace periods. However, despite their randomi-
zation, the granting of grace periods was arbitrary and did not depend on the un-
derlying cash-flow patterns of the borrowers. Hence, they were not able to control 
whether the investigated borrowers needed the grace period to compensate cash-
flow induced liquidity shortfalls. In a similar experiment with randomly assigned 
loans to borrowing groups in India, Czura et al. (2011) tried to extend the earlier 
research and implicitly addressed potential cash-flow shortfalls of the borrowers. 
To limit other sources of influence, they only focused on dairy farmers. All bor-
rowers in their experiment used the loans to buy lactating dairy cows, i.e., cows 
that were giving milk at the time of purchase but that would stop giving milk for 
two months after the lactation phase. This event was expected to occur a certain 
time after loan disbursement, and, hence, the borrower would suffer a cash-flow 
shortfall at that moment. Czura et al. (2011) assigned different loan types to the 
borrowers: standard loans, loans with pre-defined grace periods, and loans with 
flexible grace periods where the borrower was allowed to postpone up to two re-
payment installments at any time three months after loan disbursement3. Their re-
sults show that loan delinquencies of loans with flexible grace periods were not 
higher than those of standard loans. Their experimental results showing that grace 
periods do not undermine repayment discipline are further supported by God-
quin (2004), who investigates the loan repayment behavior of MFI borrowers in 
Bangladesh. She finds that loans with grace periods have significantly lower loan 
delinquencies than standard loans. These findings suggest that switching from 
standard loans to flex loans does not necessarily affect repayment quality. More-
over, these findings support the argument that decreasing the number of repay-
                                                          
2 During a grace period the borrower only needs to partly fulfill his repayment obliga-
tions (principal, interests). The graced repayment obligations are postponed to the fu-
ture, usually when returns occur. 
3 Given the monthly repayment plans, the postponement of two installments is similar to 
a two-month grace period. Two months is the average resting phase of a dairy cow be-
tween two lactation periods. During the resting phase the cow produces no milk, and, 
hence, generates only costs and no returns. 
144 Ron Weber 
 
ment installments bears potential to increase efficiency of MFIs as flex loans are 
not associated with higher loan defaults. 
Hence, it is not surprising that a recent approach to enhance access to finance 
for agricultural MSMEs is driven by the commercial microfinance industry. Chris-
ten and Pearce (2005) have presented the principles of this new “Agricultural Mi-
crofinance Model” which adapts the general microfinance approach for agricul-
tural MSMEs. In this attempt, the German AccessHolding Microfinance AG (rep-
resented through Access Banks in currently seven developing and emerging coun-
tries) was among the first institutions that introduced flex loans for agricultural 
MSMEs in Africa and in Madagascar in particular. 
3 Institutions 
The institutions investigated in our evaluation are AccessBank Tanzania (ABT) 
and AccèsBanque Madagascar (ABM). Currently only ABM has introduced and 
offers flex loans. 
ABT is a commercial MFI with a special focus on MSMEs. The bank operates 
in Tanzania as a fully-fledged commercial bank and is owned by the five founders, 
the AccessHolding Microfinance AG, the Belgian Investment Company for De-
veloping Countries, KfW (the German Development Bank), the International Fi-
nance Corporation (IFC), and the African Development Bank. During the first 
four years of operation from 2007 to 2011, the bank grew steadily and currently 
operates eight branch offices in the greater Dar es Salaam area. ABT disburses all 
loans in the local currency, Tanzania Shilling (TZS), and procedures of the bank 
are specially designed for and only allow for disbursing individual loans. Up to 
date (2013), the bank only offers standard loans in the micro segment, and loans to 
agricultural entrepreneurs are still granted under the standard loan procedures. 
Hence, they are not yet adapted to the agricultural production cycles and have 
fixed repayment schedules and maturities without grace periods. 
ABM operates as a fully-fledged commercial MSME bank in Madagascar and 
is owned by its founders, the AccessHolding Microfinance AG, BFV-Société Gé-
nérale, KfW, IFC, and the Triodos-Doen Fund. ABM offers its services through 
17 branch offices. In contrast to ABT, the branch network of ABM reaches far be-
yond the capital Antananarivo where ABM began its business after foundation in 
2007. Like ABT, ABM also disburses all loans only in local currency (Madagascar-
Ariary, MGA) and only on an individual lending basis. At the moment, there are six 
different business loan products in the micro segment: standard loans, housing 
loans, emergency loans for unforeseen private expenditures (e.g., accidents), flex 
loans, warehouse receipt loans4, and value chain loans in cooperation with an input 
                                                          
4 ABM owns the warehouses and takes stocks of crops (currently only rice) from farmers 
(at market prices) as loan collateral. During the loan repayment period, the stock can be 
reduced according to the changing collateral requirements. ABM charges the client with 
a stock depositing fee. Besides getting the stock as collateral accepted, the farmer bene-
fits from increasing crop prices after the harvesting season. 
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supplier5. Besides loans, both banks offer various types of deposits, ATM services 
(only ABT), and money transfer services (Western Union, Money Gram). 
The loan granting process of both banks is typical for commercial MFIs in-
volved in individual lending and is similar to other banks of the AccessHolding  
Table 1. Client Characteristics of AccessBank Tanzania and AccèsBanque Madagascar 
1  Farmer Standard Loan, agricultural firms with standard loan; Farmer Flex Loan, agricul-
tural firm with flex loan; Non-Farmer, non-farmer with standard or flex loan; ***,**,* 
indicate a significant mean difference between farmers with standard loans and farmers 
with flex loans  compared to non-farmers on a 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
Comprises only primary agricultural producers, i.e., livestock, crop as well as fruit and 
vegetable producers. 
2 SD, Standard Deviation. 
3  CU, Currency Unit in thousand Tanzania Shilling for AccessBank Tanzania and in thou-
sand Malagasy-Ariary for AccèsBanque Madagascar. 
                                                          
5  ABM cooperates with an input supplier for poultry production. If a loan applicant fulfills 
the requirements to raise a high-yield poultry breed, he will use the loan from ABM to 
buy a full package to raise these chickens from the input supplier (chicken, vaccination, 
feed). Thus, the farmer generates higher returns through a better chicken breed, and the 
bank reduces its risk that the client’s business will work out unsuccessfully. 
 AccessBank Tanzania AccèsBanque Madagascar 
  Farmer
1 




Flex Loan Non-Farmer 
Variable Unit Mean SD2 Mean SD2 Mean SD2 Mean SD2 Mean SD2 
Household Income CU3 986 1,084 1,040 1,232 1,944*** 2,714 575*** 853 3,620 6,755 
Household Expenses CU3 – – – – 1,632*** 1,511 357*** 694 3,264 6,480 
Age years 44*** 9.42 39 8.32 40.61*** 10.26 41.67*** 11.07 39.80 9.74 
Gender (female) % 71*** – 40 – 51*** – 26*** – 59 – 
Family Members number 5.29*** 2.08 5.00 2.00 4.76*** 1.89 5.55*** 2.15 4.66 1.86 
Marital Status  
(married) number – – – – 88*** – 89*** – 85 – 
Higher Education % 30*** – 24 – – – – – – – 
Work Experience month – – – – 86.62*** 65.70 165*** 115 107.47 74.31 
Repeat Client % 39 – 37 – 35*** – 11*** – 37 – 
Deposit % 72 – 47 – 68*** – 71*** – 66 – 
Number of Observations 
(total) number 538 20,796 3,113 2,221 88,782 
Animal Producers number 531 – 3,083 222 – 
Crop and Vegetable 
Producers number 7 – 30 1,999 – 
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Microfinance AG (Weber and Musshoff, 2013). In addition to intensive on-site 
client assessments, this includes the verification of investigated information 
through cross-checks carried out by the loan officer and a decentralized loan deci-
sion at the branch office level through a credit committee. 
Table 1 provides a characterization of non-agricultural and agricultural clients 
of ABT and ABM and even further classification of both animal and fruit and 
vegetable producers. Whether a client is classified as an agricultural entrepreneur 
is decided by the banks along the following two criteria: First, more than 50 % of 
the client’s household income needs to be generated through agricultural produc-
tion, i.e. crop, fruit and vegetable, or livestock production. Second, the client must 
use the loan for agricultural production purposes. This strict classification only 
covers primary agricultural producers. Clients with businesses only related to ag-
ricultural production (input supply for farmers, processing of agricultural produce) 
are not considered as agricultural clients. Based on the seasonality of a farmer’s 
production type, he can be granted a standard loan or a flex loan.For Tanzania, ta-
ble 1 reveals that farmers are mostly animal producers, are on average five years 
older, have a slightly larger family size, are mostly female, and are better educated 
than non-agricultural loan applicants. In Madagascar, household income and 
household expenses of farmers are lower than for non-farmers. There is a lower 
share of female clients in the group of farmers with flex loans compared to farm-
ers with standard loans and non-farmers. Furthermore, farmers with flex loans are 
mostly crop and vegetable producers, and farmers with standard loans are mostly 
animal producers. 
4 Evaluation Questions and Methodology 
Taking into account the attributes of standard loans and flex loans and the existing 
experience with the effects of inflexible repayment schedules on credit access for 
firms with cyclical cash flows, we will assess the overall success of the introduc-
tion of flex loans along the following evaluation questions: 
1. “Product”: Are lending principles and product characteristics of flex 
loans adapted to farmers’ needs? 
2. “Credit Access”: How far can standard loans and flex loans achieve the 
financial inclusion of farmers? 
3. “Loan Repayment”: Does the financial inclusion of farmers increase the credit 
risk of the MFIs? 
4. “Sustainability”: Is agricultural lending a strategic field of business for 
ABM? 
In order to answer our evaluation questions, we chose a mixed-method approach, 
consisting of (I) the investigation of the flex loan procedures in AccèsBanque 
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Madagascar, based on field visits to two branch offices in different regions of 
Madagascar and semi-structured interviews with the bank’s staff and clients; and 
(II) an in-depth portfolio analysis of ABT and ABM. 
For (II) we applied data-adjusted regression analyses to investigate (a) the 
probability that a loan applicant receives a loan when he applies for one, (b) when 
an applicant is granted a loan, how much of the amount he is asking for finally is 
approved (this approach corrects also for likely income differences), and (c) how 
many of the loan installments the borrower has to pay are not paid in time. In all 
of our analyses, clients with standard loans (without grace periods) serve as the 
reference group. This reference group is plausible for three reasons: First, it com-
prises the majority of all borrowers; second, this group can be observed since the 
MFIs were founded; and, third, this group is the benchmark for both banks’ man-
agement to judge the success of any product modification. 
The datasets we use for the portfolio analyses comprise all microloans both 
banks have disbursed since the first month of operation (ABT: November 2007, 
ABM: February 2007) until April 2011 (ABT) and May 2012 (ABM). Our data 
was extracted from the Management Information System (MIS) of the banks and 
include loan and respective client data. The loan data (e.g. number of installments, 
interest rate) are generated automatically by the MIS as soon as a loan is dis-
bursed. The client data which is generated through the in-depth client assessments 
by the loan officers is entered manually into the MIS. Consequently, it was neces-
sary to clean the client data for obvious data entering errors and outliers, which 
was jointly conducted with the staff of both banks. Furthermore, we excluded 
those loan applications that were withdrawn by the client before the bank had 
made a loan decision, loans that were still in the decision process, and loans with 
incomplete client or loan data. 
The in-depth portfolio analyses summarize the key results of Weber and Muss-
hoff (2012), Weber and Musshoff (2013), and Weber et al. (2013). The reader is 
referred to these articles for a detailed explanation of applied regression ap-
proaches and the regressions results. 
5 Evaluation Results 
5.1 Are Lending Principles and Product Characteristics of Flex Loans 
Adapted to Farmers’ Needs? 
This section is based on field visits to different branch offices of ABM in April 
2013 and semi-structured interviews with the banks’ staff and clients.  
In Madagascar, about 70 % of the total population (most of it living in rural ar-
eas) is employed in the agricultural sector, and the mainly small scale agricultural 
sector contributes about 30 % to the country’s GDP, after the (mainly informal) 
services and (mining) industries sectors. Hence, for ABM to successfully reach 
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small entrepreneurs in rural areas it has to ultimately acknowledge agricultural 
production circumstances and simultaneously consider the local specifics in the 
microfinance sector. For this reason, ABM introduced flex loans four years after 
its foundation but only in selected branch offices in rural areas.  
The difference between standard loans and flex loans is the consideration of 
future cash flows of the client to determine the client’s repayment capacity, i.e., 
the amount the client is able to use for loan repayment per month as loans of 
ABM must be repaid on a monthly basis. For standard loans, typically the cash 
flows of the client during a given period before the loan application are expected 
to also occur in the future. The repayment capacity is calculated on the average 
monthly cash flow minus all the client’s private expenditures reduced by 30 % 
to allow covering unforeseeable expenses (e.g., accidents). For flex loans, the 
transfer of past cash flows would be misleading as most farmers (despite the 
high seasonality of expenditures and returns) usually rotate crops year by year. 
Furthermore, commodity prices vary. Thus, the responsible loan officer has to 
structure a cash flow calendar by evaluating not only plantation and harvesting 
periods but also all related costs and returns of an agricultural activity on a 
monthly basis. Because most farmers’ agricultural activities are diversified, this 
needs to be done for all agricultural activities of the farmer. As most farmers 
also have income from non-agricultural sources, these sources also need to be 
considered and might even have to be assessed with the procedures for standard 
loans. The higher the farmer is diversified, the less likely it is that he will c.p. 
face months with negative cash flows and, hence, negative repayment capacities. 
Nevertheless, flex loans allow for granting grace periods for months with nega-
tive cash flows. ABM grace periods are defined by months with loan repay-
ments below the annuity that would be due with the application of a standard 
loan. There are also consecutive grace periods possible, and cash-flow analyses 
are verified by credit committee members for each loan on the branch level. One 
further difference to standard loans is the frequency and the purpose of visits to 
clients after loan disbursement. While with standard loans only one visit is fore-
seen to keep in contact with the client before the first repayment installment (for 
standard loans typically one month after disbursement), one additional visit 
takes place with flex loans. The purpose of visits is to verify that the loan was 
used to finance the intended activity. The reason for this verification is that for 
the cash-flow estimation the returns of the financed activity were considered, 
and a deviation (e.g., when the farmer plants another crop) increases the prob-
ability that the client runs into repayment problems.  
Concluding, these flex loan procedures show that lending principles in ABM 
are designed to respond to the farmers’ needs. They further demonstrate that 
loan officers in agricultural lending need special skills. They must be experi-
enced with standard loan procedures and need to have a profound understanding 
of farming. 
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5.2 How Far Can Standard Loans and Flex Loans Achieve the Financial 
Inclusion of Farmers? 
This section is based on mean comparison tests between agricultural and non-
agricultural clients of ABT and ABM as well as regression analyses wherein the 
sector affiliation of the client was considered as an additional control variable.  
Our results for Tanzania reveal that farmers applying for standard loans have a 
lower probability of receiving a loan than non-agricultural firms. Furthermore, the 
loan amounts for farmers with access to credit are not significantly different than 
those for other clients of ABT. Our results for Madagascar, however, are different. 
Here, farmers applying for standard loans have the same probability of receiving a 
loan as non-farmers. The results further show that farmers applying for flex loans 
have a higher probability of receiving a loan compared to non-farmers. For the 
loan amounts disbursed, we find that farmers with standard loans receive larger 
loan amounts than non-farmers. For farmers with flex loans, we find lower dis-
bursed loan amounts compared to non-farmers. When comparing farmers with 
standard and flex loans, we find that farmers with flex loans have a higher prob-
ability of receiving a loan than farmers with standard loans. In contrast, we find a 
largely negative effect for the disbursed loan amounts, indicating that farmers with 
flex loans receive smaller loans than farmers with standard loans, a result which 
might be related to the cautious lending practice, i.e., the perceived credit risk of 
ABM for clients with flex loans. Of further importance for the interpretation of 
these results is the consideration of the loan distribution among agricultural pro-
duction types financed through both loan products. Here our data reveal that al-
most all flex loans were granted to crop and vegetable producers whereas standard 
loans were mostly granted to animal producers. 
We conclude that the better credit access probabilities for seasonal farmers in-
dicate that providing flex loans helps to financially include farmers with seasonal 
production types. The loan distribution amongst production types for both banks 
further reveals that the client share of seasonal agricultural producers was rather 
low when flex loans were not accessible. This suggests that without providing flex 
loans, non-seasonal agricultural producers would be addressed by the banks, but it 
is unlikely that seasonal agricultural producers would be given credit access at all. 
5.3 Does the Financial Inclusion of Farmers Increase the Credit Risk for 
the MFIs? 
This section is solely based on regression analyses wherein the sector affiliation of 
the client was considered as an additional control variable. 
Our findings for ABT indicate that agricultural clients with standard loans re-
port lower delinquencies than non-agricultural clients. For ABM, our results re-
veal no significant delinquency differences between farmers and non-farmers with 
standard loans (both without grace periods). Taking into consideration that most 
farmers with standard loans are animal producers with continuous returns, this re-
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sult does not seem surprising. In contrast, we find higher delinquencies for farmers 
of ABM with flex loans than for non-farmers with standard loans (both without 
grace periods). This suggests that while the provisioning of flex loans seems to be 
a prerequisite to creating credit access for farmers with seasonal production types, 
flex loans without grace periods cannot overcome seasonality related repayment 
risks of seasonal agricultural producers. However, this difference disappears for 
those farmers with flex loans that were granted a grace period. Hence, grace peri-
ods are crucial for flex loans to bridge the wedge between discontinuous returns 
and continuous repayment obligations. 
To sum up, from a risk perspective our findings reveal that standard loans seem 
to be adequate for farmers with continuous returns and that grace periods are cru-
cial for financially including farmers with seasonal production types without in-
creasing delinquency levels. Moreover, our results confront the widespread wis-
dom that agricultural borrowers are generally riskier than non-agricultural bor-
rowers when they are adequately addressed. 
5.4 Is Agricultural Lending a Strategic Field of Business for ABM? 
This section is based on field visits to different branch offices of ABM in April 
2013 and on semi-structured interviews with the banks’ staff and clients. 
After two years of lending experience with flex loans and, hence, the agricul-
tural sector, ABM began to further develop the agricultural lending business with 
products corresponding to the clients’ needs (warehouse receipt loans, value chain 
loans). This seems especially plausible as the agricultural sector contributes about 
30 % to the country’s GDP. Considering at the same time the high share of people 
employed in agriculture, the challenge of agricultural finance in Madagascar is the 
fragmentation of the sector, resulting in high costs per disbursed loan. These 
higher costs have to be compensated by the interest rates charged. Thus, even if 
the efficiency of loan provisioning by ABM can be considered as high, agricul-
tural lending is associated with higher lending costs when farm sizes remain small. 
The question is whether and how ABM can overcome this problem. Seeking for a 
further standardization of the flex loan lending principles seems to be a promising 
field of intervention. Yet, given the already high efficiency of ABM in agricultural 
lending, the cost reduction potential here is limited. The increase of the average 
farm size resulting in larger requested loan sizes could circumvent this dilemma; 
however, this is beyond the banks’ influence (unless the bank would strategically 
focus on larger farmers, which is not the case) and will depend on the general eco-
nomic development of Madagascar. If employment opportunities emerge, people 
will migrate to urban areas and, hence, sell or lease their property to others. Dur-
ing the field visits such tendencies could be observed although these observations 
cannot be generalized for the agricultural sector as a whole. However, looking at 
the profit margins of ABM’s agricultural producers (both seasonal and non-
seasonal), there is no reason to assume that farmers are unable to cover the (only 
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slightly) higher interest rates charged by ABM for flex loans. Taking this into con-
sideration we would like to state explicitly that we find no reason for political in-
terventions in agricultural lending (e.g., interest subsidies, interest rate caps) in 
Madagascar. Given the sustainability of agricultural lending in ABM and the short 
time period of only two and a half years the bank has experience with flex loans, we 
even believe that any market distorting lending policy intervention would jeopardize 
the strategic focus of ABM towards agricultural lending. At the moment, however, 
there is no such intervention in sight. Furthermore, not only the costs of borrowing 
determine the decision whether and from which institution farmers borrow. We find 
that when farmers request loans, the money is needed at that time (and not a month 
later). The fast loan processing time (1–7 days from application to disbursement) 
can be considered as the most important competitive advantage for ABM gener-
ally and for the agricultural lending business in particular.  
The sustainability of ABM’s agricultural lending will also depend on how the 
bank will be able to manage the weather risk exposition and specifically covariate 
weather risks in its loan portfolio in the future. Here, the geological conditions of 
Madagascar which split the island into different ecological zones sensitive to dif-
ferent weather events guarantee a natural diversification to some extent. The same 
follows (with regional differences) from farmers’ generally well diversified pro-
duction schemes. However, extreme weather events (e.g., droughts in the western 
part or hurricanes in the eastern part of the island) can instantaneously affect all 
seasonal production types in one region. In order to avoid largely negative effects 
on the banks’ performance, ABM can either continue to conservatively assess ag-
ricultural yields and commodity price developments or seek for risk transfer in-
struments (or both). The latter might be too early to consider as the bank currently 
has only 3.8 % of the total loan portfolio exposed in the primary agricultural sec-
tor. However, the bank seeks for an (primary) agricultural share of the total loan 
portfolio of up to 25 % which might be a different story. 
In conclusion, we consider agricultural lending a strategic field of business of 
ABM. The positive experiences with flex loans have even led to further focusing 
the agricultural sector in Madagascar by the introduction of new products. Addi-
tionally, the positive experience of ABM has led to the launch of flex loans by 
ABT (and further banks of the AccessHolding Microfinance AG in Africa will fol-
low). Moreover, the warehouse receipt loans which were only recently introduced 
by ABM already showed demonstration effects for one other MFI in Madagascar. 
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